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Advancing U.S. Interests with
International Criminal Court

the

Address by His Excellency Ambassador David J. Scheffer*
Vanderbilt University Law School, March 27, 2003
It is a great pleasure to be here in this beautiful lecture hall at
Vanderbilt University Law School and to have the opportunity to
speak to you this afternoon about the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
In recent months, one newspaper or magazine article after
another, in examining the foreign policy of the current administration
and the gulf (which seems to be so pronounced now) between the
United States and even its closest allies throughout the rest of the
world, has listed a basic set of treaties as being partly explanatory of
that gulf. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, is always part of that
discussion in the context of climate change. But another such treaty
is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

ROME STATUTE ON THE ICC AND THE U.S. ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

While I was negotiating the Rome Statute during the last
decade, it generally remained a backburner issue. Not many people
were focused on it at all, certainly very few in the political realm, and
getting any reporter interested in it was a Herculean task. I never
dreamed, at that time, that the ICC would rise to such prominence as
a part of the analysis of why the United States has drifted so far from
even its closest allies. One of the reasons the ICC has become so
prominent is that its source treaty is emblematic of many other treaty
relationships and multilateral negotiations where, in the past couple
of years, the United States has disengaged rather than engaged.
The International Criminal Court has become an icon of analysis
as to why that has happened. Thus, especially for students on the
verge of going out into the world to practice, it is an interesting
phenomenon to examine how central this treaty has become in a
much larger geopolitical dialogue about the role and responsibilities
of the United States in the world. That the treaty has suddenly

* Ambassador David J. Scheffer is a visiting professor of law at Georgetown
University Law Center. He was the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
(1997-2001) and led the U.S. delegation in negotiations creating the International
Criminal Court.

1567

1568

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.1567

become a fulcrum of that discussion was something rarely anticipated
during the negotiations, because at times it was so incredibly
technical. I think it is extremely important that we start any
discussion about the International Criminal Court with its purpose.
That is what is most commonly lost in the United States when we
debate the ICC. Our primary concern always seems to be the
potential exposure of the United States to this court.

ICC PURPOSE
The purpose of this court arose from the 1990s phenomenon of
post-Cold War atrocities, erupting in ways that shocked us. In
response, we cobbled together ad hoc tribunals such as the
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Through that experience there developed a keen interest in
addressing such atrocities in a more permanent way, so that we
would not have to build courts every time an atrocity occurred
anywhere in the world. Beginning in 1989, with a proposal by
Trinidad and Tobago for a permanent international criminal court
that would prosecute the international crime of drug trafficking, the
objective quickly evolved by the mid-1990s into a permanent criminal
court that would resurrect the purposes of Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals after World War II. The ICC has been designed to
investigate and prosecute what I describe as atrocity crimesgenocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes-that
basket of crimes which has now become the focus of international
criminal tribunals.
With that major purpose during the negotiations, we had our
sights on the atrocities of our time. We kept in mind what was
happening in the Balkans, what was happening in Rwanda, what was
happening in the Congo, what was happening in so many other places
in the world where massive assaults on civilians were taking place in
real time. That was the central focus for the negotiators and that is
the focus embodied in the actual words of the statute of the court. It
is extremely important to keep this in mind because, as you engage in
further discussions about this here in the United States, you will
quickly be drawn into the question of how U.S. actions may be subject
to this court's jurisdiction.

IMPACT OF ICC ON U.S. ACTMTIES
The potential exposure of the United States to the ICC is a fair
question. I had to deal with it at all times as a negotiator. But we
must not lose sight of the fact that it was not the central focus of the
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ICC, I often wished, when I was in the policy rooms of Washington
with my colleagues-at the White House, at the Pentagon, at the
Justice Department, and at the State Department-in countless
meetings about this court at the high levels, that we would have some
discussion about the central purpose of the ICC. But it almost never
occurred. Those meetings were all focused on the potential U.S.
exposure to the court, and how I would manage that issue going into
the next round of negotiations.
I wished at times that I could have shown them what I had
seen-I was in atrocity zones all the time. It would have been
beneficial, I think, for policy makers to have been faced with twenty
mutilated children from Sierra Leone walking silently through the
policy room while we were talking, just to remind them what our
meeting was about, to get them to focus on the real reason we were
there. It is not just about the United States, it is about a lot of other
things going on out there. We have a stake in it, and we should be
part of the solution. Of course, I worked for an administration, with
leaders such as President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright,
that was essentially sympathetic to that purpose. Still, even from
their perspective, at the end of the day, the primary issue,
understandably, was the exposure of the United States to the ICC.
U.S. Exposure: Crimes Addressed
The ICC has three baskets of actionable crimes: genocide, crimes
against humanity, and serious war crimes. It does not yet exercise
actionable jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Although the
crime of aggression is included in the statute, it is not yet defined as a
crime and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted by the court. The crime of
aggression cannot be prosecuted by this court until such time as the
treaty is amended with a definition of aggression as an actionable
crime. So, at least for the near term, take aggression off the table; it
is not relevant for our discussion.
Genocide
Only those three baskets of crimes are relevant, with a high
magnitude test for each basket. The U.S. government simply is not in
the business of conspiring to commit these types of crimes. If we are,
there is something seriously wrong with our decision making in
Washington and we ought to face up to it. Genocide, under the
statute, must take place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct, in other words, the acts of genocide that are in the
Genocide Convention, directed against a designated group, or conduct
that could itself affect such destruction. The Genocide Convention,
about which I will go into detail later, does include an inherent
magnitude test. No one is prosecuted in real terms for a single act of
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genocide against a single individual. That should never occur. In fact,
I do not know of any example where that has occurred. The crime of
genocide has its own magnitude test, and the statute recognizes that.
Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, and the
attack must include the commission of multiple crimes against a
civilian population pursuant to, or in furtherance of, a state or
organizational policy to commit such an attack. The necessary policy
to commit such an attack against a civilian population requires that
the state or organization actively promote or encourage such an
attack against a civilian population. The perpetrator must have
known that the conduct was part of, or have intended the conduct to
be part of, a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population. The ICC Prosecutor must look to that test before
he can take the next step in determining whether or not he proceeds
to the pretrial chamber to seek an indictment.
War Crimes
War crimes, for purposes of prosecution before the ICC, are
crimes committed as part of a plan or policy, or part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes, and only when the material elements of
the crime are committed with intent and knowledge. The definition of
the crimes must be interpreted within the established framework of
the international law of armed conflict, which is very important to the
military. You do not make end runs around that; you have to stay
within it. The perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances
that establish the existence of an armed conflict. No one will be
inadvertently convicted of this crime as it is defined in the Rome
Statute and its important Article 9 (Elements of Crimes). A
perpetrator has to be focused on what he is doing and must have
intended that a civilian population, as such, or individual civilians
not taking a direct part in the hostilities, be the object of the attack.
Finally, with respect to the war crime of excessive incidental death,
injury, or damage, the crime must be of such an extent as to be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. And while that is a technical definition, it is
one that was actually brought to the table by the U.S. Department of
Defense.
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U.S. Exposure: Due ProcessProtections
U.S. negotiators spent many years negotiating the ICC's
protection of due process. With me at the negotiating table, I had my
Pentagon team (some in uniform, some civilian lawyers at the
Pentagon) and my Justice Department team. These men and women
were focused on due process. The irony, I think, especially in light of
our experience with the Taliban and Al Qaeda now, is that their job
was to make sure that the due process rights of any accused
individual, for example an accused war criminal who might be
indicted by the ICC, were fully recognized and honored by the court.
That is why I found a little ironic what occurred after September 11,
2001, and during the assault on Afghanistan, with respect to those
who were apprehended. I remembered those years of negotiations
where we fought day-in and day-out for the due process rights of
mass murderers, but I did not see that replicated in the ways we were
handling various terrorist suspects in the field.
What are these due process rights? Let me quickly list them for
you: (1) the equivalent of a probable cause hearing, (2) liberal pretrial
discovery, (3) public trial in the presence of the accused, (4) right to
counsel and to confront one's accusers, (5) privilege against selfincrimination, (6) notice of the charges, (7) provisional release
pending trial, (8) bars against non-prohibitive and unreliable
evidence, or evidence secured in violation of human rights, (9) proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, (10) right of appeal, (11) presumption
of innocence, (12) prohibition of any adverse inference from the
exercise of the right of silence, (13) right to conduct defense in person
or through the defendant's chosen council, (14) cross-examination of
witnesses and the calling of witnesses on one's own behalf, (15)
disclosure of any exculpatory evidence, and (16) right not to be
subjected to any form of duress, coercion, or any cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment. We successfully incorporated all of these
rights.
The Rome Statute includes a guarantee of a form of Miranda
warning. In the United States, this right arises in cases of custodial
interrogation. Under the jurisdiction of the ICC, the prosecutor must
advise a person of his rights before he is questioned, whenever there
are grounds to believe that he has committed a crime, even in noncustodial interrogations. This includes a reminder of the right to
remain silent, the right to legal assistance, the right to have counsel
appointed if he cannot afford it, and the right to be questioned in the
presence of counsel.
The major difference between this and common-law procedureremembering that in the international theatre we primarily fuse civil
and common law-is that there is no trial by jury, only bench trial.
This issue was taken off the table fairly quickly. Most of the world
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does not have trial by jury, and so to bring the right to a jury trial to
the table and insist upon it in an International Criminal Court leaves
most of the other delegations in the room scratching their heads and
asking, "Come again, what is that? Where are you coming from with
that?" Civil-law procedure involves only judges. So the bench decides
the case before the International Criminal Court. There is no trial by
jury. But, when you really think about it, you probably do not want a
jury of twelve peers from all parts of the world to sit in judgment of
your defendant in this court for these types of crimes. You want very
expert judges who know the law, and who can understand the
complexities of atrocity law,' to be the judges of your innocence or
guilt for these particular crimes.
The civil law system also offers the availability of appeal by the
prosecutor from errors of fact, law, and procedure, which the
common-law system does not afford. I think it is important to
remember what Monroe Leigh, who was the legal advisor at the State
Department during the Ford Administration, said about all of this.
He said that the list of due process rights guaranteed by the Rome
Statute is, if anything, somewhat more detailed and comprehensive
2
than that in the U.S. Bill of Rights, not better but more detailed. It
cannot be denied that the Rome Statute contains the most
comprehensive list of due process protections that has thus far been
3
promulgated.
Judge Patricia Wald, who was a recent judge from the United
States on the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, also endorses the
protections contained in the Rome Statute. She has been visiting
places all over the world expressing her confidence in the due
process rights of the ICC, particularly, in light of her experience at
the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.
Complimentarity
The International Criminal Court has a basic safeguard and
reality check. It is called complimentarity. What does that mean? If
any of you are students of European politics, you probably know the
word subsidiarity,which is where the European Commission and the
European Union try to devolve down to the national and sub-national
levels as many forms of government possible, as opposed to imposing
a supra-national form of government in Europe. Well, having a lot of

1.
For an explanation of the term "atrocity law," see David J. Scheffer, The
Future ofAtrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 389, 393-402 (2002).
2.
The InternationalCriminal Court: Hearing Before the House Committee on
InternationalRelations, 106th Congress 94-95 (2000) (statement of Monroe Leigh on
behalf of the American Bar Association).
3.
Id.
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those people in the room influenced the discussions and we quickly
came upon the notion of complimentarity, which makes the ICC
essentially a court of last resort. The ICC delegates to domestic
courts, by its very framework, the first cut at the crimes within its
jurisdiction. Therefore, domestic courts have the first right, the first
option, to seize a case, to investigate it, and if merited, to prosecute it.
That is complimentarity.
Now, those cynical of the court will argue, "Oh well, that is all
very nice in terms of how you have structured it, but there is an
endpoint to complimentarity which brings it right back to the ICC
judges to determine whether or not your domestic system has done a
good job of investigating and prosecuting the individual." My
response to that is that in most cases there will be no final review by
the ICC, but the possibility of such a final review was essential. There
would be no complimentarity if that ultimate escape hatch, back to
the ICC judges, were not to exist. It would be a sham. The courts in
Zimbabwe could simply say, "We have the case; thank you very much.
You are off deck, ICC, permanently." In some cases there will have to
be a judgment about whether a given national system has exercised
its political will to investigate the case, whether it is capable of
investigating the case, or whether it is a failed society, a collapsed
state with an obviously crippled legal and political system.
Shortcomings of the U.S. Code
What are the circumstances of failed complimentarity? Should a
case ultimately go to the ICC because the complimentarity tests are
not met at the outset? We argued with great confidence that the U.S.
government knows how to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes
and should have no hesitancy in doing so. If our citizens are charged
with atrocity crimes, we should seize jurisdiction as quickly as
possible and do the job the U.S. Code demands our prosecutors do. I
must admit, however, that one of the great weaknesses we still have
with respect to this court, and one upon which I think the most severe
critics of the court and the strongest supporters of the court should
have no problem agreeing, is the reality that there are parts of the
U.S. Code that reveal gaps between crimes recognized by the Code
and those set forth in the Rome Statute. In other words, not all the
crimes against humanity that are set forth in the Rome Statute are
replicated in the U.S. Code.
The crime of murder is certainly covered by the U.S. Code, but
the "crime against humanity" as it is defined, in terms of
extermination, relationship to persecution, and the other crimes set
forth in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, is not covered by the Code.
There are many gaps in our own law. We have not updated it
sufficiently to prosecute the atrocity crimes of our time. This is not
anyone's fault; we simply have not done it.
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Neither Title 10 nor Title 18 of the Code has been updated in
relation to customary international law. There are enormous gaps.
Take, for example, the crime of genocide: we have severe restrictions
on whom we can prosecute for the crime of genocide. I experienced
this very clearly. We had a Rwanda Tribunal indictee living in
Laredo, Texas, enjoying life with a green card. His name was
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, and he was a pastor from Rwanda, living
with his doctor son in Laredo. The indictment came down in Arusha,
and we deployed U.S. Marshals to Texas to track him down. We found
him and arrested him for the purpose of transferring him to Arusha
to stand trial before the Rwanda Tribunal. Ramsey Clark became his
lawyer, and we started a four-year effort in U.S. courts ultimately to
transfer him to Arusha. We succeeded in early 2000. He was
transferred and just recently was convicted and sentenced by the
Rwanda Tribunal. So the case was closed. But it was a long journey
and a precarious one at times. I will never forget asking my INS and
Justice Department lawyers, "Look, if we fail here, we have got to
find a way to prosecute this man in U.S. courts. He is charged with
genocide; he must not walk free; we must find a way to prosecute this
individual. How will we do it?" And of course the answer was, "Sorry,
but under U.S. law, you either have to be a U.S. citizen (not a green
card holder) who has committed genocide elsewhere in the world or a
foreigner who has committed genocide on U.S. territory. If you are not
in one of those two categories, we cannot prosecute you here."
Those are the types of gaps in our law that we need to focus on.
Unless we were fully capable of prosecuting these crimes in our
courts, an ICC judge could easily say, 'You are not capable of
prosecuting this crime against this U.S. citizen, so we are going to
seize this case." We do have a weakness in our system, and we need
to correct it.

Other Safeguards
There are other safeguards built into the treaty that are
important for us to recognize and understand. The U.N. Security
Council has considerable power to refer situations to the court and
thus fill up its docket. As a Security Council permanent member, if
the United States had a cooperative posture towards this court, we
could collaborate with our friends on the Security Council simply to
fill the docket very quickly with situations we thought needed to be
investigated but which did not impinge upon any U.S. interests. It
may seem very cynical to put it that way, but if you were really smart
about this court, you might think about such a strategy involving the
Security Council.
The Security Council also has the power, under Article 16 of the
Rome Statute, to stop the court from investigating a situation or
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case-simply to shut it down for twelve months on the grounds that
the Security Council needs to work the issue for purposes of peace
and security. If the United States had a cooperative posture towards
the court, then we would have the credibility with our friends on the
Security Council to use that power significantly. We could, shall we
say, manage the accountability agenda worldwide, emphasizing what
we think should go forward and what we think should be held in
abeyance in order for the Security Council to handle violent
situations in real time before even reaching the accountability
agenda. Unfortunately, in the last two years we have developed such
a confrontational attitude towards this court, that any such measures
that we might take, and which we are perfectly entitled to take, are
hampered by a growing credibility gap.
FourAdvantages to Ratification
Let me just say that if we were someday to ratify the Rome
Statute-and it may not be for four, eight, ten, or even fifteen yearswe would immediately gain four advantages. First, we could employ a
right under the treaty not to be exposed to any war crimes charges for
seven years. That is a quirky provision (for which we can thank
ourselves and the French), but we could use it, just as the French
have done. Second, if the court were to define the crime of aggression
and approve it as an amendment to the Rome Statute, we would not
have to embrace that crime. We could simply opt out of its application
to the United States. We would have that right, as a state party, to
opt out of any new crime that might be added to the statute. Third,
we would have enormous influence in the nomination of judges, the
prosecutor's staff, and the prosecutor himself or herself. We have no
such influence now, and, of course, there is no U.S. judge on the
bench, as yet.
I always thought that the best recommendation for a U.S. judge
on the ICC would be a JAG judge. We should put one of our best
military lawyers on the bench, one very cognizant of the law of armed
conflict, because there are no such individuals on the bench right
now. Of eighteen judges, there is not a single military law expert. We
could have brought that to the bench and had an enormous impact on
how the court thinks about situations and how it understands the law
of armed conflict. Our nominee for judge would have been elected;
there is no question about that. Of course, we do not have that option
unless we become a ratified party.
Fourth, and finally, we would have influence over the operation
of the court overall. During my experience with the Yugoslav and
Rwanda Tribunals throughout the 1990s, almost every single day I
received not just one, but often multiple phone calls from both
tribunals, whether from the prosecutor, the judges, or the staff,
seeking cooperative links with the U.S. government in order to get
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their job done. That is just a reality. And by having that sort of
relationship with a court of this nature, we could wield enormous
influence over how the court operates because it would look to us for
assistance. By responding to those requests, we would begin, day by
day, having an influence over the operation of the court in a very
constructive way. Primarily, such requests involve resources and the
apprehension of fugitives, both of which allow the U.S. government to
have an enormous impact on the process. However, between the
United States and the ICC, there is no such communication; in fact, it
is prohibited under the American Servicemembers' Protection Act.

STRATEGIES FOR U.S. ADJUSTING TO THE ICC

I will finish by talking about how the United States can adjust to
the ICC. I have already talked about revising federal law. I have
talked about how the U.N. Security Council can refer cases or even
block the work of the court in relation to the U.S. role on the Security
Council. We can also cooperate.
There is a waiver in the American Servicemembers' Protection
Act called the Dodd Amendment. At least under certain
circumstances, this would allow the U.S. government to cooperate
with the ICC. There is also nothing prohibiting U.S. lawyers from
serving as defense counsel on the ICC. So those of you aspiring to be
defense counsel have a huge opportunity out there, as you gain
experience. I assure you it is an honorable profession. These
individuals need the best possible defense counsel. That is what
establishes the integrity of the process.
I was recently in The Hague for the swearing-in of the eighteen
ICC judges, and I had the, I suppose, dubious distinction of being the
only U.S. government official, past or present, in the room at the
time. While I was there, I had the opportunity to sit in on the
Milosevic trial, at the Yugoslav Tribunal, for several days. It is
astonishing, the abuse that results from someone like Milosevic
representing himself-a great issue for discussion, particularly in a
law school setting. It extends the trial; it introduces enormous
inefficiencies. What astonished me was that the amicus lawyer for
Milosevic just had to sit there, a fantastic lawyer, in his English wig.
It would have been so beneficial for the court to hear him defend
Slobodan Milosevic. It would have been so exciting, and the quality of
the trial would have been upgraded enormously. Yet, he just sat
silently because Milosevic was defending himself, introducing
documents from unknown sources. Judge May would give Milosevic a
little bit of leash and then have to jerk him back every ten minutesjerk, jerk, jerk, jerk-back and forth. It becomes very tedious after
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two hours of watching such tactics and disciplinary measures. But it
is part of the process.
Finally, if the United States were in the game, even if we were
not a ratified party, we could at least be in there, negotiating the
crime of aggression. They are talking about it now, and we are not
there. If there is any crime that the Unites States is accused of (check
your papers this morning) it is the crime of aggression. Right? What
was said in the Security Council yesterday by one government after
another, is that the United States and the United Kingdom are
accused of being engaged in aggression against the state of Iraq.
Consequently, we have a lot at stake in what this word means and
how this court ultimately embraces it as an actionable crime.
When I was negotiator, some of the negotiations I enjoyed the
most were the aggression negotiations because I always had such
clarity in my own thinking about where the ICC should go on this
issue. The court is already primed to prosecute the crime of
aggression, but it has to have a realistic set of parameters about how
far it can go in doing so. Also of vital importance is the exact
definition of the crime for the purposes of individual criminal
culpability as opposed to state responsibility. It is a fascinating
question, and the United States has such a strong position, it ought to
be in the room on the issue. We even had consensus among
permanent members of the Security Council about how to work the
issue.
I will just conclude these points by saying that, in my mind, the
best way to protect U.S. interests is always to be in the room
negotiating, engaging, and bringing the force of our principles to the
table rather than withdrawing from the room and abandoning it. In
my view, any withdrawal from negotiations of this character is an
abdication of the responsibility to protect U.S. interests. In this
country, we have developed-and the ICC experience is emblematic of
it-a cultural fear of multi-lateral institutions and of treaties of this
character. That fear, the sense of almost being intimidated by this
process, grows stronger and stronger. It is an extremely dangerous
trend.
The United States should be at the forefront of these
negotiations, whether they involve climate change, the biological
weapons protocol, or the ICC. The list of treaties we have not ratified
is quite long, and we could repair many bridges throughout the world
simply by ratifying the easy ones. For instance, there is no reason.
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions should not be
ratified. President Reagan was the one who submitted it to the
Senate in 1986 for ratification. What is the problem with that one?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is another good
example; there is really no reason that should not have been ratified.
The best example is perhaps the Law of the Sea Treaty-the
Pentagon has long supported its ratification. What is the problem? In
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the negotiations for the ICC, I sought many provisions that protected
U.S. interests, and the record will show that I got almost every single
one of them. But, during that process, other governments would say
to me, "Okay, we are going to give this to you, we are going to concede
this point to the U.S. government. We know what this is, though, we
have been here before. We reopened the Law of the Sea Treaty after
1981, and spent thirteen years negotiating it. We gave you exactly
what you wanted in that treaty, and you signed it in 1994, but you
have never ratified it. So what was the point of that exercise? Why
did we do that for you guys? Now, what if you do that to us on the
ICC?" Such failure to ratify important treaties significantly affects
our negotiating position and our very credibility. At some point, we
have to be honest brokers. By being honest brokers, at the end of the
4
day, we best protect U.S. interests.

4.
For a detailed discussion of the U.S. approach to the ICC negotiations
during the Clinton Administration, see David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
InternationalCriminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (Nov. 2001 - Feb. 2002).

